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This report was prepared as part of a project, funded by AngloGold Ashanti (AGA), in which 
the Earth Institute at Columbia University, in partnership with Millennium Promise, worked 
with local governments and communities around the gold mines in Northern Guinea to 
formulate integrated MDG-based local development plans. In addition, the Columbia Center 
on Sustainable Investment (CCSI), a joint Center of Columbia Law School and the Earth 
Institute, assessed the legal and fiscal framework for investments in gold in the region to 
better understand the total impact of and contribution to development of this sector.  
 
This report forms part of that analysis: specifically looking at how revenues from the mines 
could support local development plans. At the time of the drafting, in mid-2013, the 
Government of Guinea was formulating new regulations to govern how resource revenues 
would fund local development. The purpose of this report is to serve as the basis for 
discussion and consultation between the Government of Guinea and its development partners 
in the public and private sector as the regulations are being finalized; the report helps to shed 
light on relevant aspects of the legal framework to-date, including how they have operated in 
practice, and shares models and good practices of community development agreements and 
community development funds from elsewhere in the world. 
 
This is a work product of CCSI and does not necessarily reflect the views of any other 
organizations or partners in the Northern Guinea projects, including the Government of 
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The 2011 Mining Code introduces specific requirements for the establishment of a Local 
Development Fund (LDF) and Community Development Agreements (CDA) between mining 
companies and local communities (see Box 7 for a summary of the relevant legal provisions 
in the Mining Code).  The provisions in the Mining Code on the LDF and the CDA are not 
very specific, but current drafts of a Presidential Decree and an Arrêté (Ministerial Order), 
issued by the Ministère des Mines et de la Géologie (Ministry of Mines, or MoM) and the 
Ministère de l'administration du territoire et de la décentralisation (Ministry of 
Decentralization, or MATD) respectively, provide more details.
1
 This report examines how 
the LDF and CDA requirements can be implemented effectively, focusing in particular on the 
Société AngloGold Ashanti de Guinée (SAG) mine and its past experiences with local 
development funding.  
 
The report draws on literature on subnational revenue sharing, community development 
agreements and local development funds, relying notably on case studies, guidelines and 
model regulations and agreements. To better understand the LDF and CDA process in the 
Guinean context, CCSI engaged with stakeholders in the country. At the local level, this 
included meetings in Siguiri with representatives from the Préfecture of Siguiri, the 
Communes, Conseil préfectoral de développement de Siguiri (CPD) and nongovernmental 
organizations (NGOs) (see Box 1 for an overview of the administrative structure of the local 
government in Guinea). At the central government level, CCSI met with representatives of the 
MoM and the MATD, as well as with representatives of civil society and the international 
donor community. These meetings provided insights into the political and institutional 
context, as well as the ongoing implementation processes of the new local development 
regime. In addition, CCSI reviewed the draft versions of the Decree and Ministerial Order 
(June 2013), which provide additional detail on the implementation of the LDF and the CDA 
respectively.  
 
The first section of the report provides an overview of the prior legal and institutional regime 
for local development funding in Siguiri, and addresses the main challenges faced in the past 
to implement projects from those funds. The second section introduces the current legislative 
regime and the draft Decree and Ministerial Order; explains the challenges that this new 
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regime poses; and draws on the experiences of other countries in addressing similar 
challenges. The third section provides suggestions for the draft Decree and Ministerial Order, 
as well as recommendations for how the Government and mining companies can work 
together to maximize the benefits of local development funding. 
 
Box 1: The organization of local government in Guinea
2
 
The local government in Guinea is built around two axes
3
: 
(1) Circonscriptions territoriales (administrative sub-divisions) are under the authority of the national 
government, and composed of the Régions administratives (Regions), the Préfectures (Prefectures), 
the Sous-Préfectures (Sub-Prefectures, one for each of the Collectivités locales (local authorities)) and 
Districts. Under the district level are Villages and Quartiers.. The Governeurs (Governors), who run 
the Régions, and the Préfets, who run the Préfectures, are appointed by presidential decree, while the 
Sous-Préfets are appointed by the MATD. 
 
 
(2) Collectivités locales (Local authorities, CL) are composed of the Communes rurales (Rural 
municipalities, CR) and the Communes urbaines (Urban municipalities, CU).  
              They are administered by elected authorities: 
- the Conseil local (Local council): In rural municipalities, the local council is a Conseil communautaire 
(Community council), while in urban municipalities, it is a Conseil communal (Communal council). 
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 For more detailed information on the structure and administration of local government in Guinea, please refer 
to « Evaluation du contexte institutionnel de la décentralisation et du système administratif en Guinée », MDG 
Center, March 2012. 
3







For both types, members are elected for four years. The Conseil local approves the Local Development 
Plan and budget.  
- the Bureau communal (Executive council): This council is composed of an elected authority (a 
Président (President) for rural municipalities or a Maire (Mayor) for urban municipalities, both of 
which have a four-year mandate), one or several vice-presidents (based on population density) and a 
treasurer. 
-  the administrative council: This council is composed of an administrative secretary, a communal 
general secretary and a tax collector appointed by a decree and sectoral departments. 
The CL are under the control of the Sous-Préfet (Article 36, Constitution) and were created between 1986 and 
1992 to foster the decentralization process. The political climate caused a stalemate of this process in the 1990s 
and 2000s.
4
 The Code des collectivités locales (Local Authorities Code, CCL) of 2006, which transferred 
further responsibilities to the CL and defined their rights and obligations, is intended to revive the 






Illustration of the local administration at the Siguiri gold mine 
SAG operations are located in the Région of Kankan, which is composed of several Préfectures, including the 
Préfecture of Siguiri. The Préfecture of Siguiri consists of several Sous-Préfectures, among which are the Sous-
Préfectures of Kintinian, Franwalia and Siguri-Centre.  
 
                                                        
4
 Lettre de Politi ue Nationale de  écentralisation et de  é eloppement Local  2 11  pp  2-5). 
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Kintinian, Franwalia and Siguiri are not only Sous-Préfectures, but they are also Collectivités territoriales 
governed each by a Conseil local.  Kintinan and Franwalia are Communes rurales, governed by a Conseil local 
called Conseil communautaire. A Président is at the head of the Executive council of the Commune rurale. 
Siguiri-Centre is a Commune urbaine, governed by a Conseil local called Conseil communal. A Maire is at the 
head of the Executive council of the Commune urbaine. 
1. Local development funding in Siguiri prior 2011 
1.1. Legal and institutional regime prior 2011 
1.1.1. Legal basis for the local development tax  
The local development regime in Siguiri dates back to the 11
th
 of November 1993 when SAG 
signed the Convention de base (Convention), which foresaw the payment of a local 
development tax to support the neighboring communities of the mining projects. This 
Convention, amended in 2005 and a 1993 amendment made to the convention of another 
mining company (Societe Miniere de Dinguiraye - SMD) operating in the same area, form the 
basis for the current local development regime. These documents provide little detail on how 
the regime should be implemented, enabling large discretion in the elaboration of the local 
development agenda and the institutions that manage the local development tax.  
 
Box 2: Provisions in the agreements dealing with local development 
The Convention establishes the development tax paid by SAG to date. Article 13.9 defines the tax as a 




The 2  5 Amendment pro ides that SAG should “take part in local de elopment”  A enant  Article 5  25 July 
2005)
7
 and cooperate with the members of the Conseil local and the Préfecture  Howe er  the term “local 
de elopment” is not defined and there is no reference to the development tax.  
 
                                                        
6
 “La Société de ra ac uitter un impôt préfectoral ou local pour le développement regional, equivalent à 0,4% 
des recettes brutes annuelles sur ses ventes. Cet impôt sera acquitté de la même manière et au même moment que 
la taxe à l’exportation  isée à la Clause 13 3 ” (Convention de base, Article 13.19, 11 November 1993) 
 
“The Company shall be subject to a prefectural or local development tax equal to 0,4% of gross sales revenues 
each year  Such tax shall be paid in the same manner and time as the export tax under Clause 13 3 ” (SAG, 
Convention de base, Article 13.19, 11 November 1993) 
 
7
 “Afin de mieux participier au dé eloppement local  la SAG a ec l’accord de ses Actionnaires  mettra en oeu re 
un plan triennial (2006-2  9) de realization de 5 forages d’eau potable par un  ou tout autre ou rage à but social 
(maternité, crèche, écoles…) dans la limite budgétaire corrrespondant aux 5 forages  Ces ou rages seront 







The 1993 Amendment to SMD’s
8
 convention requires payment of a development tax, stipulates that the tax goes 
to the budgets préfectoraux (prefectural budgets) and notes that detailed rules for the use and distribution of the 
parties’ contributions will be defined by the State and the in estor  SM   A enant  18 2)h  1993)) 
9
  This 
Amendment does not provide guidance on the administration and use of the tax.  
1.1.2. Management and investment of the development tax 
To date, the Conseil préfectoral de développement (Prefectural Development Council, CPD) 
and its predecessors have been responsible for the implementation of projects using the 
development taxes paid by SAG and SMD.  The Government and SAG have agreed that 
SAG’s de elopment tax should be paid into an account administered by SAG  The funds must 




Box 3: Evolution of the Conseil Préfectoral de Développement 
1998 to 2005 - Comité Préfectoral de Devéloppement (Prefectural Development Committee, Comité) 
In September 1998, the Comité was created to analyze, modify and approve project proposals made by the 13 
Collectivités of Siguiri (with assistance from CECI) (see Box 4).
11
 Their approval was contingent on the 
alignment of the project with the LDPs. The Comité also served as a forum for the different stakeholders to 




2005 to date – Conseil Préfectoral de Développement (CPD) 
In 2005, the Comité was transformed by law into a Conseil  C  ’s role is similar to the Comité: it serves as the 




The Comité and initially the CPD were presided over by the Préfet of Siguiri
14
.  In November 2011, a 
Presidential decree (CPD Decree) ordered that the President of the CPD be determined by election; it could be 





, the pre-2011 CPD was not in line with the Code des collectivités locales (CCL), because 
allowing the Préfet to serve as C  ’s  resident and thus decide on local development projects was incompatible 
with the transfer of local development responsibilities in the decentralization process. MATD has announced that 




 CGA Report (p. 2) 
11
 CGA Report (p. 2). The documents do not provide information on the legal documents on the basis of which 
the Comité was set up. The documents also do not indicate how the proposals by the Collectivités were 
elaborated.     
12 CECI Presentation (p. 11). 
13
 CGA Report (p. 3). 
14
 The documents reviewed do not specify that the Préfet was president of the Comité, but the 2011 CPD Decree 
foresaw the replacement of the Préfet by either an elected authority or a member of civil society. 
15
 MATD Meeting, 23 April 2013. 
16
 According to Fanta Mamadi Conde, the MATD directed the changes that it considered necessary against the 







any remaining contradictions between the provisions of the CCL and the role of the CPD will be taken into 
account when designing the new regime.  
1.2. Past and current challenges of local development funding in Siguiri  
Since the introduction of the local development regime in Siguiri, several challenges have led 
to suboptimal allocations of the funds received through the development tax. The MATD 
sought to commission a study to assess the strengths and weaknesses of the CPD, but it is 
unclear if this study has gone ahead and if so when the results are to be published.
17
 
Separately, the MATD has recently approached SAG to finance an evaluation study of the 
CPD in Siguiri. As these studies are yet to be completed, they could not be reviewed for this 
report. Based on in-country consultations and the available literature (see annex 1) the main 
challenges can be divided up into (a) institutional design, capacity and organization; (2) 
transparency and accountability; and (c) cooperation between SAG and the Communes. These 
will be discussed in more detail below.  
1.2.1. Institutional design, capacity and organization 
The institutional regime of local development funding in Siguiri has always provided for 
monitoring mechanisms (see Box 4). Over the years, the monitoring body has been integrated 
within CPD. Initially, monitoring was run by CECI, an independent Canadian NGO, which 
was staffed and funded independently from the CPD and its predecessors. In 2005, the CGA 
was created to undertake the monitoring, funded by the development tax and run by former 
CECI employees. Eventually, the Technical Support Unit, which is part of the CPD, was put 




Box 4: Monitoring mechanisms  
In January 1998, Siguiri Prefecture requested assistance from the Canadian NGO, Centre for International 
Studies and Cooperation (CECI), to design efficient and transparent mechanisms for the management and 
investment of the development tax and to help build capacities within the Préfecture  the “Projet de 
Développement Socio-Economique de Siguiri” (Socio-Economic development project of Siguiri, PDSES), 
established by SAG and CECI
18
). In response to this request, in February 1998, CECI undertook the first socio-
                                                        
17
 The information that this study had been commissioned was given by MATD (23 April 2013). 
18
 In their first agreement in July 1998, SAG and CECI defined their cooperation in setting up the Projet de 
Développement Socio-Economique de Siguri (PDSES) and agreed to provide the necessary human and financial 
resources for running the PDSES. Thus, no funding for PDSES came from the development tax (CECI 







economic study to determine the development needs in Siguiri. Building upon this study, Local Development 
Plans (LDPs) were elaborated for the 13 Collectivités of Siguiri, i.e., the 12 Communes rurales (de 
développement) and the Commune urbaine.
19
 CECI also became the implementing agency that executed and 




With the creation of CPD in 2005, the initial cooperation between CECI, SAG and the Comité ended. CECI and 
SAG had agreed to set up a new body that would take o er CECI’s role,
21
 and, in line with this, the Cellule de 
gestion autonome (Self Management Unit, CGA) was created in 2005
22
. CGA was run by former CECI 
employees and financed directly by the 0.4% development tax. The task of CGA was to assess, execute and 





The 2011 CPD Decree, however, did not provide a role for CGA, and CPD then determined that maintaining 
CGA was too expensive. SAG did not agree to provide additional funding for it, on top of its 0.4% development 
tax commitment (part of which previously funded CGA),
24
 and the former employees of CGA refused an offer 
made by CPD to continue funding it with a 66% salary reduction. Instead, a new Technical Support Unit was 




Although independence does not necessarily lead to better monitoring, the integration of the 
monitoring body into CPD combined with its decreased financial and institutional 
independence correlates with an apparent decrease of monitoring effectiveness
26
. The 
necessity of the monitoring unit’s independence from the C   was highlighted in CGA’s 
Report.
27
 A criticism put forward by one stakeholder, for example, was that staff selection for 
the Technical Support Unit has been politically motivated. This integration has not only led to 
a lack of competence in carrying out the technical supervision, but it has also undermined the 
necessary distance that would allow critical oversight and monitoring of CPD activities.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
SAG and CECI in February 1998 (p. 7). It is not clear when the subsequent agreements were signed. The 
information relating to these agreements comes from Fanta Mamadi Conde, who used to work for CECI and 
later managed CGA (CECIDE Meeting, 26 April 2013). 
19
 The documents reviewed for this report do not the specify the various roles of the parties in the elaboration of 
the LDPs, but the CGA Report indicates that they were the result of the work undertaken by CECI and other 
NGOs (CGA Report (p. 2)).  
20
 CGA Report (p. 3), 
21
 Here again, the documents reviewed do not provide detailed information. The information relating to these 
developments comes from Fanta Mamadi Conde. 
22
 It is not clear on what legal basis this was done other than the initial agreement between CECI and SAG. 
23
 CGA Report (p. 4). 
24
 Interview with Fanta Mamadi Conde 
25
 CPD Meeting, 19 April 2013. 
26
 Interviews with NGOs 
27







Moreover, it is not clear whether the Technical Support Unit has the mandate, capacity and/or 
financial means to monitor the financial aspects of the development projects. Unlike CECI or 
CGA, the Technical Support Unit does not have staff responsible for the financial aspects (see 
Box 5).
28
  Although the unit organizes the tender offers, its work focuses on the technical 
aspects of the projects, i.e., organizing and supervising the construction process. There is thus 
no body in charge of monitoring the financial aspects of the development projects.  In 
comparison, CECI not only supervised technical aspects, but also provided increased 
transparency and accountability on the financing side of the projects.  
                                                        
28








Box 5: Current structure of CPD 
 
Pursuant to Article 6 of the CPD Decree, the Decision-Making Body elects the members of the Executive Organ. 
The Decision-Making Body itself is composed of its statutory members, including representatives from the 
Circonscriptions territoriales (i.e. representatives of the national government) and the Collectivités locales (i.e. 
representatives of the Elected authorities), civil society and the private sector (Article 3, CPD Decree). 
 
While it is not entirely clear how the voting process works, the Decision-Making Body must follow certain 
guidelines, which are further discussed in section 2.3.1. 
 
In addition, the Communes ha e criticized the Technical Support Unit’s supervision of the 







of the Préfet residency’s reno ation 
29
 According to the Secretary General  C  ’s Technical 
Support Unit did not properly supervise the construction process and when the construction 
companies failed to carry out the work according to the tender offer, the CPD declined to 
intervene. The Communes believe they are better positioned to monitor the construction work. 
The companies that undertake the construction work, however, do not feel accountable to the 
Communes because they are selected and paid by the CPD. To resolve this issue, the 
Secretary General suggested that the Communes should pay the construction companies 
directly.  
 
The new regime should delineate who is responsible for monitoring and implementing 
projects, ensuring that the nominated parties are independent from each other and have the 
necessary expertise.  An independent monitoring and evaluation body is recommended. 
Section 2 explains whether and how the draft Decree/Arrêté addresses these issues. 
1.2.2. Transparency and accountability 
In theory, the current regime includes mechanisms to ensure that only projects that effectively 
contribute to local development can be funded by the development tax. Projects need to be 
aligned with the development approach of the Préfecture, be part of the Local Development 
Plan and/or address the needs of the majority of the population.
30
 The consultancy firm Arthur 
Andersen was contracted by the CPD to develop guidelines for the project selection process; 
these have since been updated. According to these guidelines, a participatory diagnosis and a 
needs assessment are the basis for the selection process of development projects that seek to 
be funded by the CPD.
31
 Although the CGA Report states that these guidelines have been 
applied
32
 in the past, they are not available for public access and the CPD representatives 
were unable to provide CCSI with a copy. This inaccessibility clearly limits the possibility of 
public oversight in the project selection process. Conversely, making the guidelines publicly 
accessible would contribute to the overall transparency of the local development regime. The 
lack of accessibility of relevant documents is a recurring concern that should be addressed 
in the new regime. 
 
                                                        
29
 Although we understand the need to ensure that individuals such as the Préfet are adequately housed, it is 
questionable whether the renovation of the Préfet’s residency fulfills the criteria to qualify as a project that can 
be financed by the development tax, as it is unlikely to have a large developmental impact nor does it address the 
majority of the population, . 
30
 CGA Report (p. 4). 
31
 Ibid. (p. 5). 
32







The CGA report notes that none of the accounting documents of the CPD showed updated 
costs and expenses of the projects funded by the development tax.
33
 The report criticizes the 
absence of justification for differences between the budgeted costs indicated during the 
selection process of the projects and the actual costs at the time of their execution.
34
 In the 
majority of cases, the cost estimates for the projects were inaccurate and lacked precision
35
.  
As CGA was tasked with “e aluating  executing and monitoring the projects”, as well as 
bookkeeping and accounting of the CPD and its projects
36
, is therefore partly responsible for 
these inconsistencies.  
1.2.3. Cooperation between SAG and Communes  
In meetings with Commission de réflexion pour le développement de Siguiri (Committee on 
Local Development in Siguiri, CRDS)
37
 and the CPD, the representatives voiced concerns 
about the absence of SAG in the local development process. The CPD, for example, was 
concerned that SAG has not had a significant presence in most of the bi-annual meetings of 
the CPD. Further, the CRDS criticized not having a contact person at SAG, which made 
coordination efforts more difficult.  The precise role that CRDS and CPD wish SAG to play is 
not clear. Companies’ roles in the process should be addressed in the new regime. 
  
                                                        
33
 Ibid. (p. 21). 
34
 Ibid. (p. 21). 
35
 Ibid. (pp. 6-8). 
36
 Ibid. (p. 4). 
37
 CRDS is a lobby group/interest group based in Conakry. It is composed of high-level representatives of the 







2. Local development funding under the new LDF and the CDA 
2.1. Political dynamics behind the call for change  
The changes to local development funding created by the Mining Code of 2011 are better 
understood in the context of the political dynamics. An important factor is the decentralization 





Government intends for the local development regime to be fully integrated into the legal and 
institutional regime of the decentralization process. The current draft decree on “procedures 
for the establishment and use of the contribution of a rights holder for the development of the 
local community and rules of operation and management of funds for local economic 
development (FODEL)”  FO EL  ecree) and draft “joint Ministerial Order on model 
community de elopment agreements”  Ministerial Order) reflect this intention. The 
Communes are in charge of the management of the development tax and the design and 
implementation of specific development projects pursuant to the Code des Collectivités 
(CCL)
40
, while the Préfecture-level (i.e., CPD, to be re-formed under the FODEL Decree) 
plays a monitoring role
41
 and decides on the allocation of the development tax between and 
within the Communes
42
 (See Box 7 for a summary of the FODEL Decree and the Ministerial 
Order). 
 
Box 6: Code des Collectivités locales (CCL) 
Cooperation between Communes  
 
Under Article 59, the Collectivités (i.e., Communes rurales and Communes urbaines) can establish Conférences 
inter-collectivités (Inter-Local authorities conferences) in which at least two Communes debate issues that affect 
them. The recommendations made at these Conférences must be approved by each of the Conseils
43
 of the 
participating Communes. The Préfets and Sous-Préfets are allowed to attend these Conférences as observers 
(Art. 60).  
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 Meeting with MoM, 24 April 2013. 
39
 Meeting with MATD, 23 April 2013. 
40
 Article 7, FODEL Decree 
41
 Article 11, FODEL Decree – see Box 7 on the uncertain language provided  by Article 11. 
42
 Article 8, FODEL Decree 
43








Under Article 62, one or more Collectivités can decide to associate in a Regroupement (Group) in order to work 
on or manage non-profit public interest projects.
44
 Under Article 63, other Collectivités may at a later stage join 
the Regroupement if allowed under the rules of the Regroupement. However, the approval of the Conseils of all 
Collectivités that constitute the Regroupement is required. 
 
Budget and Accounting requirements  
Section 3 of the CCL establishes the Publicité du budget (Budget transparency). Chapter 5 provides a number of 
requirements for accounting purposes, including the need to make the accounts public (Section 6, Art. 508).  
 
Local Development Plan and Annual Investment Program 
The CCL sets out requirements for the elaboration of Local Development Plans (LDP) (Titre I, Chapitre I-III), as 
well as Annual Investment Programs (AIPs) -- the annual breakdown of the 5-year LDP (Titre I, Chapitre IV-V). 
The AIP has to specify the following elements (Article 529): (1) planned investment works, (2) cost of these 
investments, (3) sources of funding for these investments, (4) costs for maintaining the investments, (5) sources 
of funding of these maintenance expenses. Once the AIP is adopted, the Communes must follow it, allowing only 
a few readjustment exceptions (Article 531). In order to enhance transparency, the Communes must prepare a 
fiche de projet (project profile) for each development project. The fiche de projet must contain information with 
respect to funding, execution and management of the development project and be available to the public (Article 
534). The Communes monitor the fulfillment of the AIPs.  
 
2.2. Defining the beneficiaries of the LDF and CDA 
Article 130 of the 2011 Mining Code establishes a local development fund (LDF), as well as a 
requirement for companies to sign a community development agreement (CDA) with the 
“local community” li ing on or in the direct proximity of the mining concession.
45
 However, 
the LDF is not defined in the Mining Code and neither is its method of allocation.  The draft 







                                                        
44
 “[R]éaliser en commun un projet d’utilité publi ue  soit de gérer en commun un bien ou un droit indivis, soit 
de gérer en commun un ser ice administratif ou un ser ice public ” “Les regroupements de collecti ités locales 
sont des groupements d’intérêt public constitués entre deux ou plusieurs collecti ités locales en  ue d’exercer en 
commun  dans un but non lucratif  certaines attributions conférées aux collecti ités locales”  
45
 Article 13   Mining code: “[C]ommunauté locale résidant sur ou à proximité immédiate de son titre 








Box 7: Article 130 of the 2011 Mining Code, draft FODEL Decree and draft Ministerial 
Order 
1. Article 130 
 
Article 130 of the Mining Code
46
 requires that 1% of the turnover of gold mining companies is paid into a local 
development fund. The article also requires the negotiation of CDAs with local communities
47
 that live on or in 
the proximity of the mine site. The CDAs need to provide for:  (1) the transparent and efficient management of 
the money contributed by the mining companies to the LDFs; (2) capacity building for the local communities; 
(3) training for the population; and (4) measures for the protection of the environment and health of the 
communities, as well as processes for the development of social projects.  
 




The FODEL Decree provides for a single Local Economic Development Fund (FODEL). Every mining 
company must open a bank account - named the “FO EL bank account” - with either the central bank or a 
commercial bank (Article 4, FODEL Decree). Every Commune will also open a bank account; the Decree 
recommends that this account should be opened with the same bank used by the mining company.  
 
Allocation of the development tax 
 
A new CPD will be set up in every Préfecture on the basis of a regulatory text (Texte règlementaire), which is 
yet to be developed. In order to allow for a better harmonization
48
 of the development actions in the Préfecture, 
the CPD decides, through consultations,
49
 on the allocation of the development tax between and within the 
Communes taking into account the concerns of financial equalization. (Article 8, FODEL Decree). 
 
It is not clear to what extent CPD will prescribe how much money is to be spent in specific geographic areas of 
the Commune.   
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 “Tout titulaire d’un titre d exploitation doit contracter une Con ention de  é eloppement a ec la communauté 
locale résidant sur ou à proximité immédiate de son titre d'exploitation ou de sa concession minière. Les 
modalités d'élaboration de ces conventions sont définies par arrêté conjoint des ministres en charge des mines et 
de la décentralisation. 
L’objet de cette convention est de créer les conditions favorisant une gestion efficace et transparente de la 
contribution au dé eloppement local payée par le titulaire du titre d’exploitation  et  ui tienne compte du 
renforcement des capacités des communautés locales à la planification et à la mise en œu re de leur programme 
de développement communautaire. 
La convention doit inclure, entre autres, les dispositions relatives à la formation des populations locales et plus 
généralement des guinéens, les mesures à prendre pour la protection de l’en ironnement et la santé des 
populations, et les processus pour le développement de projets à vocation sociale. Les principes de transparence 
et de consultation seront appliqués à la gestion du Fonds de Développement Local ainsi  u’à toute con ention de 
développement de la Communauté locale qui sera publiée et rendue accessible à la population concernée. 
Le montant de la contribution du titulaire d’un titre d exploitation au dé eloppement de la communauté locale est 
fixé à zéro virgule cinq pour cent (0.5%) du chiffre d'affaire de la société pour les substances minières de 
catégorie 1 et à un pour cent (1%) pour les autres substances minières. 
Il est créé un Fonds de Développement Local (FDL) qui sera alimenté par cette contribution du titulaire du titre 
minier dès la première année d’exploitation  Les modalités d utilisation de cette contribution et les règles de 
fonctionnement et de gestion du Fonds de Développement Local sont définies par un Décret du Président de la 
République.”  
47 We understand that a further version of the Mining Code, presented on June 12, 2013, includes a definition 
for "local community", to include all communities (collectivités) affected under a mining title or authorisation 
 “ensemble des collectivités affectées par l'activité minière dans le cadre d'un titre minier ou d'une autorisation“)  
However, the term "affectées" is not defined. 
48
 “pour une meilleure harmonisation des actions dans la Préfecture”  article 8  FO EL  ecree) 
49








It is also not clear whether CPD will have a consultation role, beyond the allocation of the tax. 
 
Management of FODEL 
 
The management of the development tax will be under the authority of each Commune, pursuant to CCL (Art. 
7, FODEL Decree). 
 
Monitoring and Evaluation 
 
The CPD, together with representatives of the mining company, will be in charge of monitoring and evaluating 
FODEL (Article 11, FODEL Decree). It is not clear from the current draft of the FODEL Decree whether it is 
also intended for the CPD to verify that only projects following the selection criteria will be funded.  Article 11 
of the FODEL Decree provides that the CPD will monitor the actions taken under Article 12. This appears to be 
an error in reference and should perhaps refer to Article 13, which sets out the selection criteria for 
development projects. 
 
A Ministerial Order by MoM and MATD will set up a National Committee (comité technique) to monitor the 
development regime. It will be composed of representatives from the MoM and MATD (Article 12, FODEL 
Decree). The FODEL Decree does not provide more details on this National Committee’s specific role  but it 
appears that it is intended to monitor not only how the Communes manage the development tax, but also how 
the CPDs carry out their monitoring function of the Communes.  
 
Criteria for funding of projects 
 
Article 13 of the FO EL  ecree states that projects that will “generate re enues” are eligible for FO EL 
funding, and provides a non-exhaustive list of examples of the types of projects that may qualify.   
 
3. CDA Ministerial Order  
 
The contracting parties 
 
The Ministerial Order does not clarify the definition of “local community”  but it provides that the Président of 
the Collectivité locale will sign the CDA (Article 4, Ministerial Order). The Model CDA, in the Annex of the 
Order, indicates that the CDA will be between the company and the relevant Commune. There is, however, no 
definition provided. 
 
The concluded CDA must be approved by the Minister of Mines and Geology and of the Communities (Article 
5), both of whom are also responsible for the implementation of the Ministerial Order (Article 7). 
 
Preamble and obligations of the contracting parties 
 
The Preamble of the Model CDA foresees that the agreement will be for a period of 25 years and is intended to 
facilitate the dialogue and mutual understanding of the mining companies and the local communities.  
 
The Model CDA also details the obligations of the mining companies and the Communes as follows. 
 
Obligations of the company (Article 3.1, Model CDA) include: 
 
- set up a Community Relations Department and elaborate a community communication agenda; 
- support local authorities in the conception, execution and monitoring of projects in a range of areas, 
such as local tourism development, support local economic development, etc. 
 
Obligations of the Commune (Article 3.2, Model CDA) include: 
 
- work closely with all stakeholders and hold monthly meetings with the mining company; 
- use the resources of the Commune (including the development tax) in a transparent and efficient 
manner to implement projects of LDP, pursuant to CCL; 
- use the Service Préfectoral de Developpement (Prefectural Development Service, SPD) for capacity 







- keep the population informed and involved. 
 
2.2.1. Identification of Communes and allocation of funds amongst them 
 
The Mining Code’s reference to “local community” raises se eral important issues: 
 
First  the term “local community”  “communauté locale”) does not ha e a legal meaning in 
the administrative context of Guinea (unlike Commune or Collectivité locale). The Decree 
refers to Collectivités locales, i.e., the Communes, as the intended beneficiaries
50
 of the LDF, 
while the Ministerial Order still uses the language of “communauté locale”   The Annex to the 
Ministerial Order, however, suggests that it is the Communes that are intended to enter into 
the CDAs.  A new version of the Mining Code may include a definition.
 51
  The definition of 
“communauté locale” should be made clear in the Mining Code or the Ministerial Order. 
 
Box 8 gives two examples of legal texts that have been used in Ghana and Sierra Leone to 
address the definition of local communities.  
 
Box 8: Defining the local community – Examples from Ghana and Sierra Leone 
The beneficiaries of the fund set up by the Ahafo Gold Project in Western Ghana are limited to the 
communities directly affected by the mine and located within the boundaries of the concession. In the Social 
Responsibility Agreement, local communities are defined as: 
 Community towns that are physically located in the Mining Lease of Newmont Ghana Gold Limited 
within the current operational area of the Ahafo Mine Project or within the Mining Lease area 
under active exploration.  
 Community / traditional areas that have a significant amount of its traditional land covered by the 
Mining Lease of Newmont Ghana Gold Limited within the current operational area of the Ahafo 
Mine Project or within the area of the Mining Lease under active exploration.
52
 
The Social Responsibility Agreement lists the towns considered to be the local community at the time the 
Agreement was entered into, but provides for annual review of the composition of the local community.  
The 2009 Mines and Minerals Act of Sierra Leone (section 139) gives more leeway for negotiations in its 
definition of the community that is to benefit from local development agreements, but restricts the beneficiary 
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 “Le Fonds de  é eloppement Economi ue Local  ise à promou oir le dé eloppement des collecti ités locales 
abritant les sites d’exploitation minières et celles a oisinantes”   ecree  Article 1)   
51 The “communauté locale” might be defined in the new version of the mining code (see footnote 47) 
Social Responsibility Agreement between the Ahafo Local Community and Newmont Ghana Gold Limited, 







to a single community:  
The primary host community is the single community of persons mutually agreed by the holder of the small-
scale or large-scale mining licence and the local council, but if there is no community of persons residing 
within thirty kilometres of any boundary defining the large-scale mining licence area, the primary host 




Where the licence holder and the local council cannot agree on which community is the primary host 
community, then the Minister is to make a determination.  
 
 
Second  it is not clear which communities will enter into C As as the term “proximity” in 
Article 130 is not defined. Thus it is not clear which Communes should be included. The 
Ministerial Order repeats the language used in Article 130 and does not provide further 
guidance   In the case of SAG’s operations  all communes within the Siguiri  refecture 
currently benefit from the development tax. The Ministerial Order in Guinea should clearly 
indicate whether it is the role of CPD to determine which Communes will enter into CDAs 
and will benefit from LDF. The Ministerial Order should also indicate more precise criteria 
for these decisions or advise CPD to develop such criteria.  
 
Third, in case more than one community qualifies under Article 130, the allocation of the 
funds among these Communes needs to be decided. While today all Communes in Siguiri 
benefit from the funds, there is no clear distribution key to determine which Communes 
benefit most from these funds.
54
  The Decree makes it clear that the Collectivités Locales will 
manage the LDF.
55
 However, the distribution amongst Communes is not specified in the 
Decree. Article 8 merely suggests that the allocation amongst the Communes - and within, as 
discussed in 2.2.2. - will be determined by the CPD to harmonize and equalize the financial 
impacts in the Préfecture 
 
The redistribution fund (2011 Mining Code Article 165 – see Box 10) may come into play on 
this aspect. Article 130 (development tax/LDF) could serve to alleviate tensions between the 
                                                        
53
 http://www.sierra-leone.org/Laws/2009-12.pdf 
54 According to the CPD (19 April2013), Siguiri-Centre, Kintinian and Franwalia receive most of the money 
from the development tax . 
55
 “Conformément  aux dispositions du Code des Collecti ités Locales  la gestion des financements pré us par le 








mining companies and the local communities and help them build harmonious 
relationships, while Article 165 could provide for the sharing of mining revenues more 
broadly with communities that do not benefit from the LDF.
56
 This might help to avoid 
development discrepancies among the different communities in Guinea.
57
 However, the 
example of Peru (see Box 11) demonstrates that large fluctuations from mining revenues 
might complicate redistribution efforts.   
 
Fourth, while it appears (based on the Annex to the Ministerial Order) that each Commune 
will enter into an individual CDA with the mining company, there may be a place for a 
framework agreement at the Préfecture level. This could serve as the basis to align 
development priorities, promote coordination between similar communal programs and 
harmonize the implementation (see Box 9 on how such an arrangement has been made in the 
context of the Ok Tedi mine in Papua New Guinea). Such a framework agreement could also 
address larger infrastructure projects that would affect more than one Commune (and which 
may be financed by funding from the mining company in addition to its development tax 
contribution).  While the MATD highlighted the importance of such framework agreement 
not undermining the transfer of responsibility to the Commune level, which it sees as the main 
goal of its decentralization efforts, creating a framework agreement at a later stage to the 
CDA, with a Conférence Inter-Collectivités, or Regroupement, could be helpful.  Furthermore 
as illustrated in Box 9, this framework agreement could be usefully signed before the 
individual CDAs. 
 
Box 9: Framework agreements – Ok Tedi and Ahafo mines 
Individual CDAs with each Commune can address specific local development needs. At the same time, such 
an approach is very resource-intensive and might lead to inconsistencies in development priorities and their 
implementation.
58
 Framework agreements between the company and all qualified communities that define 
binding general principles and objectives are one way to alleviate these concerns. Both, the Ok Tedi and 
Ahafo mines have signed framework agreements that encompass more than one community. 
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 Ring fencing regulations for Article 165 funds are not in place. The mechanism described above might 
therefore be vulnerable if Guinea experiences national budget shortfalls. 
57
 The necessity to take communtiy tensions into account is also addressed in EI SourceBook, Good Practice 
Note on Community Development Agreements, 2011 (p. 6). 








At the Ok Tedi mine project in Papua New Guinea, the parties set up an umbrella process in which they 
agreed on broad principles and allocations in a framework agreement. All community-specific agreements 




A similar approach was taken by Newmont’s Ahafo project in Ghana  A Social Responsibility Agreement 
between the company and all impacted communities in the  istricts of Asutifi and Tano outlined the “roles 
and responsibilities of each party and the overarching framework in which the parties are to work together to 
implement key community initiati es” 
60 
 To balance the decentralization goals of the Government with the need to spend mining 
revenues at the community level efficiently, it is recommended for the mining company to 
sign individual CDAs with each affected Commune, as well as an umbrella framework 
agreement that includes all nearby Communes as well as the CPD. While the project 
decision-making process is kept with the Communes, the umbrella framework agreement 
could describe how the affected Communes may coordinate their development agendas, as 
well as the various monitoring and evaluation mechanisms.  This framework agreement 
would provide a platform to discuss and execute cross-Commune border projects. 
Box 10: Article 165 of the Mining Code 
Article 165 of the Mining Code addresses the allocation of mining revenues
61
 other than the development tax. 
15% of Government revenues from mining projects will directly support the local budgets of the Collecti ités 
locales. According to the MATD, this support will be channeled through a redistribution fund. MoM, MATD 
and the Ministry of Finance will elaborate the details of this fund in another Arrêté.
62
 Article 165 specifically 
mentions that the relevant mechanisms will be aligned with the provisions of the CCL. 
 
Box 11: Redistributing mining revenues to the local level – The Canon Law in Peru 
The redistribution of mining revenues to producing regions is established within the Peruvian Constitution. 
The administrative setup in Peru includes 25 regions (regional government), which are subdivided into 195 
provinces and 1833 districts (municipalities). In 2001 the Canon Law was passed, which requires that all 
royalty payments and 50% of the income tax payments from mining activities be allocated to the producing 
regions according to the following distribution: 
                                                        
59 EI SourceBook, Good Practice Note on Community Development (p. 10) 
60 EI SourceBook, Good Practice Note on Community Development (p. 10) 
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 Pursuant to article 165, Mining Code, the revenues are the following: “taxe minière  les droits fixes  la taxe sur 
les substances de carrières ainsi  ue la taxe sur la production artisanale de l’Or“  Mining tax, fixed fee, tax on 
mineral substances and tax on Small-scale gold mining). 
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 Article 13 : “Les modalités d’utilisation  de gestion et de contro  le des  uize pour cent  15 ) re enant aux 
collecti ités locales font l’objet d’un arre  té conjoint des Ministres en charge des Mines  de la  écentralisation et 







 10% to the municipality in the producing district 
 25% to the municipalities in the producing province 
 40% to the municipalities in the producing region 
 20% to the regional government in the producing region 
 5% to the public universities in the producing region
63
 
This distribution mechanism has led to large budget differences among regional and local governments, 
especially when commodity prices soared. As the producing regions already had lower poverty rates,
64
 the 
distribution of canon revenues may have further increased regional disparities.
65
 The regional and 




Management challenges arose due to institutional capacity constraints at the local level, as municipalities 
suddenly had to manage budgets that were significantly higher.
67
 The figure below illustrates the fiscal 
transfers of canon and royalties to the regional and local governments (millions of Nuevos soles). 
 
Source: Araoz PPT (2013), Fiscal Decentralization in Peru: Achievements and Challenges 
 
2.2.2. Allocation of funds within the Commune 
 
Once it is decided how much each Commune will receive from the LDF, there remains the 
issue as to how to allocate the money within the territory.  Article 8 of the FODEL Decree 
suggests that the allocation within each Commune will be determined by the CPD to 
harmonize and equalize the financial impacts in the Préfecture, but the FODEL Decree does 
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not provide more guidance as to how CPD should determine this allocation.68 It is unclear to 
what extent the CPD will prescribe how much money is to be spent in specific geographic 
areas of the Commune and how much discretion each individual Commune will have in this 
respect. The Decree should clarify whether CPD only determines the allocation of the funds 




First, uncertainty remains over the geographical scope of where money should be allocated.  
The main question is whether the money should be spent exclusively on development projects 
that are in the “direct proximity” to the mine, or whether the money should also be used to 
fund projects in villages that are farther away but still within the Commune. In order to 
allocate funding efficiently and foster sustainable development around the mine more 
broadly, it is recommended that spending should not be restricted to areas within the 
Commune that are located close to the mine. 
 
 
Second, once the geographic beneficiaries are identified, the question remains of which 
projects should be funded. To date, investment decisions of the CPD have been closely linked 
to the LDP. The FODEL Decree provides some guidance, stating that projects that will 
generate revenues are eligible for FODEL funding, notably those: 
 addressing the concerns of the communities neighboring the mines, 
 being part of the LDP of the Commune, 
 having a multiplier effect for other projects, notably post-closure, 
 having a positive impact on the quality of life of the neighboring populations of the 
mine, 
 having clear performance and monitoring criteria.69 
 
It is not clear what the drafters of the FO EL  ecree mean when they refer to “projects 
creating re enue generating acti ities”  This may limit any project  e en if it otherwise would 
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 Dans chaque préfecture, un conseil préfectoral de développement (CPD) est mis en place suivant les 
dispositions d’un texte réglementaire. Il détermine par voie de concertations les modalités de pilotage et de 
péréquation des financements dans la ou les collectivités locales, pour une meilleure harmonisation des actions 
dans la Préfecture, en tenant compte des implantations spécifiques des titres miniers concernés (Article 8, 
Decree). 
69







fit within the list of criteria.  In other words, it seems that projects within the LDP that are not 
revenue generating will not be eligible for funding. It is doubtful that schools, for example, 
could be considered to generate revenues; they may therefore be excluded. The wording of 
the FODEL Decree should be clearer in defining what sorts of projects fall within the 
selection criteria. 
 
International best practice suggests that the projects under the CDAs should align with the 
LDPs to ensure that mines support the development priorities of the communities and 
complement public interventions. Apart from channeling funds to address the most 
pressing issues, such an alignment would also allow for better public-private coordination 
that is paramount to establish sustainable programs for the communities.  In order to 
ensure the alignment of the development agenda with the LDPs of the Communes, the 
FODEL Decree should specify that the Communes should implement development projects 
according to the provisions of the CCL, i.e., in line with LDPs and AIPs. The CDA (25 
years) could go further than the medium-term (5 year) LDP and set out long-term 
development objectives for the Communes, covering the life of the mining project and 
beyond. The CDA objectives could then be incorporated into the medium-term LDPs and 
short-term AIPs.  Box 12 illustrates this point. 
 
 
Box 12: Local Development Fund aligned with Local Development Programs – Fondo 
Solidaridad Cajamarca 
The Minera Yanacocha, located in Northern Peru, is the second largest gold mine in the world. The company 
was formed in 1992 with Newmont Mining Corporation (51.35%), Companía de Minas Buenaventura (43.65%) 
and the International Finance Corporation (5%) as the shareholders. In 2006, the Government entered into an 
agreement with the major mining companies on the Aporte Voluntario, a voluntary contribution by the mining 
companies to local and regional development for the following four years (2007-2011). The Minera Yanacocha 
committed to contributing 3.75% of the mines’ net profits to the Fondo Solidaridad Cajamarca (FSC), which 
amounted to US$91 million over the four years. Of this total, US$27 million were channeled to regional projects 
and US$64 million to local projects.
70
 The Technical Coordination Commission (CTC) responsible for 
approving the projects to be financed by this fund was composed of four representatives of the Yanacocha mine, 
one representative of the Cajamarca Regional Government, one representative of the Provincial Municipality of 
Cajamarca and one civil society representative. Broad guidelines within the agreement directed the spending 
priorities. For CTC to approve a project, the following conditions had to be fulfilled: (1) the project had to be 
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aligned with the local and regional development plans, (2) it had to be within the defined local or regional area, 
(3) there had to be sufficient evidence that it would have a positive impact on the target group, (4) there had to 
be sufficient evidence that the intervention would be cost-effective, and (5) there had to be sufficient evidence 
that the intervention would be sustainable. Co-financed projects proposed by the regional government and civil 
society have been prioritized (for institutional strengthening programs, for example, it partnered with USAID) 
and it is estimated that by aligning these funds with government priorities and partnering with canon minero 
projects, the FSC has generated an additional investment worth US$193 million on top of Yanacocha’s 
contribution.
71
 Over the years, project areas have included nutrition, health, education, institutional capacity 
building, rural development, local and regional infrastructure development and cultural heritage. 
2.3. Managing volatility and sustainability 
While the LDF is an important source of income for the Communes, its management poses 
significant challenges due to the volatile nature of its contributions. These can largely be 
traced back to commodity price fluctuations and the phase of the mining project. Figure 1 
shows SAG’s contributions to the LDF since 1998.  After a sharp fall in 2010 and 2011, 
contributions peaked in 2012. For 2013 SAG forecasts a contribution worth US$1.9 million. 
Such revenue volatility complicates the budgeting process for multi-year projects. This is 
especially the case when the development tax makes up a large proportion of the total 
revenues of the communes, as dependence on these funds increases. Under the Mining Code’s 
new requirement, in which gold mining companies will pay 1% of their turnover into a local 
development fund, SAG’s forecasted payments in 2013 would amount to US$4.8 million and 
hence make up a larger proportion of commune’s budgets.  
 
Figure 1: SAG Local Development Tax Payments 
 
Source: SAG 
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One way to address this challenge is to save part of the development tax in years where 
revenues are high and spend these savings in years where development tax revenues are low. 
This is illustrated in Figure 2 by the red line. 
 
Figure 2: Smoothing expenditures 
 
Source: RWI (2012), Draft Subnational oil, gas and mineral revenue management 
 
Stabilization and endowment funds are methods used to help with expenditure smoothing and 
to guarantee the long-term sustainability of projects (see Box 13 on the Rössing Foundation 
endowment fund in Namibia).  
 
Box 13: Smoothing development fund expenditures - The Rössing Foundation  
Rio Tinto Rössing Uranium Limited  RUL) set up the Rössing Foundation in Namibia in 1978 to channel RUL’s 
corporate social responsibility programs. The Foundation was to be financed by annual contributions of RUL 
worth 2  of all di idends paid out to shareholders after tax   uring the early years of the Foundation  RUL’s 
contribution was used to finance several education projects. As international uranium prices began to slide below 
US$9/pound, RUL began to struggle financially. This had a direct impact on the Foundation, as contributions 
were based on the profitability of RUL. In 1992, for the first time in its history, the Foundation did not receive 
any contributions from RUL.72  Several smaller projects were discontinued to lower the costs, but without 
prospects of recovering uranium prices and with savings running out, there were discussions of closing down the 
Foundation.  
 
The Foundation was fortunate that in the years following Namibia’s independence in 199   international aid 
flows increased significantly and donors were looking for local partners to implement development projects. The 
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Foundation’s independence from RUL and its good track record on educational projects attracted third party 
funding and enabled its continued existence.  
 
After prolonged low uranium prices, which hit rock-bottom in 2001 at US$7/pound, the market recovered again 
and prices surged to US$136/pound in June 2007. Having learned from difficult financial times, the Foundation 
set up an endowment fund in which it places a proportion of annual contributions from RUL. High uranium 
prices have increased the endowment fund significantly in recent years, thereby guaranteeing the Foundation’s 
survival even if uranium prices fall in the near future or the mine were to be shut down. 
 
Apart from managing the volatility of the development tax revenues, it is important to prepare 
for the period after mine closure. Once the mining company stops its operations, the 
Communes will lose the additional source of income for the local development projects. This 
is particularly risky when a large part of the local economy relies on the mining activities. 
Projects financed by the LDF can be an appropriate tool to address this challenge. This is 
explicitly recognized in the FODEL Decree, as it states that projects, that have positive 
economic spillover effects on other parts of the local economy especially after mine closure, 
are available for funding under the LDF.
73
 During our consultations, CRDS mentioned that 
many young people are attracted by higher salaries not only from mining companies, but also 
from activities in and associated with artisanal mining at the sites.
74
 Skills that are relevant for 
the post-mining era are therefore lost. The Papua New Guinea Sustainable Development 
Program Ltd serves as a good example of how programs can be financed to address long-term 
development goals that are unrelated to mining activities (see Box 14). 
 
Box 14: Long-term sustainability of local development funds - Papua New Guinea 
Sustainable Development Program Ltd 
The Papua New Guinea Sustainable Development Program Ltd (PNGSDP) was created in 2002 to inherit BHP 
Billiton’s 52 percent share in the Ok Tedi Mine (OTML), which BHP wanted to divest due to environmental 
concerns and potential socioeconomic repercussions. PNGSDP, a not-for-profit limited liability company, was 
set up in Singapore with the objective of acting as a development agency to benefit the people of Papua New 
Guinea and especially those communities affected by the OTML. The dividends from the OTML have been 
channeled into the Development Fund (one-third), which was set up to finance development projects during the 
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operation of the mine, and to the Long Term Fund (two-thirds), which is only accessible after mine closure and 
will continue to finance projects for a minimum of 40 years after closure. In 2011, one-third of the projects 
financed through the Development Fund were based in the western province where the OTML is located, and 




 NGS  ’s setup and financial resources  which are uni ue due to its historical background  are not easily 
replicable in other countries. But PNGSDP does provide a good example for how mining revenues can be 
allocated to guarantee the continuation of community development programs after mine closure. Apart from the 
funding mechanism, PNGSDP also aims to finance projects that could substitute for OTML as an economic 
driver in the region. PNGSDP categorizes its projects into five work streams, namely infrastructure investments 
(road construction and maintenance, upgrading of the airport, port upgrading and electrification projects), 
industry development (agriculture, forestry, fishery and banking service projects), social investments (water 
and sanitation  health and education projects)  transitional projects and ‘preparation for mine impacts’  The 
latter two in particular focus on the long term. Projects are varied, including prefeasibility studies for making 
Daru port a potential trading hub in the region, for an industrial park that would service the port, for the 
commercialization of gas reserves and for undertaking large-scale power generation projects. Apart from 
providing financing for these studies, PNGSDP will act as a facilitator to support these projects in the future 
and help identify potential investors. Since 2010, significant effort has been placed on identifying strategic 
actions that could help the transition of Tabubil from being a mine-dependent village to a mixed residential 
village of choice. In addition, methods are laid out as to how currently subsidized services can be transferred to 
third parties and made economically viable.
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The central Government should ensure that local communities do not suffer from large 
revenue/spending volatility by either providing for a local stabilization mechanism or 
adjusting the national transfers to the Commune level depending on mining revenues. In 
the case a local stabilization mechanism is adopted, the CPD should cooperate with SAG to 
assess what reasonable amount should be spent versus saved for the next year. Ideally the 
portion of the money saved each year should be invested in conservative assets to make sure 
that at least in real terms the money saved does not lose value.  Moreover, the project 
selection under the CDAs should include long-term sustainability criteria, as suggested in 
Article 13 of the FODEL Decree. 
2.4. Monitoring, evaluation, transparency and accountability mechanisms  
The new development regime designed by the draft regulations provides for a system to 
monitor the spending of the FODEL. As discussed above, the CPD, together with 
representatives of the mining companies, must ensure that the Communes only fund projects 











that follow the specified selection criteria
77
 and that the funds are managed according to 
public accounting requirements. Initial technical support and capacity building should be 
provided to the CPD. A third party could play this role, as CECI did in Siguiri in the past (see 
box 4 and section 2.7.2.). Monitoring will be based on technical and financial reports by the 
beneficiaries of the development tax.
78
 In addition, a National Committee will monitor the 
development regime.
79
 Rio Tinto’s project in the Commune of Boke (Box 19) provides a 
useful example of how external experts can be hired for monitoring and evaluation purposes 
under the supervision of multi-stakeholder committees. The Decree should also specify the 
actions that may be taken by the CPD if there is found to be mismanagement of accounts. 
 
The draft regulations provide little guidance on how to monitor the implementation of the 
de elopment projects   The regulations simply mention the company’s obligation to support 
the Commune in monitoring (as well as designing and implementing) long-term development 
projects,
80
 as well as S  ’s role in this context 
81
 The transparency, accountability and 
publicity requirements of the CCL allow for additional monitoring of the local development 
regime and the draft regulations should be revised to take these into account. Third parties 
such as NGOs and/or the mining companies could monitor the execution of the development 
projects and check whether these are in line with the objectives of the LDF. These CCL 
re uirements reflect the suggestions in the World Bank’s Community  e elopment 
Agreement Model Regulations and Example Guidelines to pro ide for “community 
de elopment annual expenditure reports” that “shall be open to free inspection by members of 




Further  “tracking funding allocations and disbursements can help alle iate concerns 
regarding accountability and transparency of payments.”
83
 Pursuant to the FODEL Decree, 
the company has to make public any payments to the FODEL bank account within 72 hours 
 Article 5)  Any transfer from the company’s FO EL account to the Commune’s FODEL 
account also has to be signed by the President of the C   and the company’s representative.  
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The CCL and the regime contemplated by the draft regulations thus leaves space for a multi-
stakeholder audit committee that could be set up to review the financial activity of the LDF.  
 
Evaluation mechanisms should also be devised to measure the impact of the development 
projects financed by the LDF. International best practice suggests that the monitoring 
should go beyond metrics such as “percentage of mining earnings distributed”, “dollars 
spent” or “programs initiated”.
84
 Monitoring should also include development metrics, 
such as UNDP’s Human Development Index.
85
 The results of these monitoring programs 
should be compiled in reviews that would serve to enhance the quality of future development 
objectives and projects. Box 15 provides an example in Peru where successful monitoring and 
evaluation tools have been applied to projects financed by mining revenues.  
 
Box 15: Monitoring and evaluation
86
 - Asociación Los Andes de Cajamarca 
After tensions arose between the Minera Yanacocha and the local community due to a mercury spill in 2000 
and the announcement of plans to explore Cerro Quillish, which is of spiritual significance to the local 
population and provides the water supply for Cajamarca city, Yanacocha expanded its community development 
programs with the launch of the Asociación Los Andes de Cajamarca (ALAC) in 2004; this was separate and 
prior to the voluntary contribution fund explained in Box 12. To gain the acceptance of the local community, 
ALAC consulted widely with key stakeholders to determine the operating structure of the organization and the 
scope of the programs it would implement. Currently its board is composed of four members of the Yanacocha 
mine, one IFC representative and three civil society members. Furthermore, the advisory panel to the board is 
made up of ten representatives of the civil society. The work streams of ALAC include institutional 
strengthening, health and education, entrepreneurship capacity building and infrastructure development. 
 
ALAC has been successful in attracting co-funding for its projects mainly due to its stringent appraisal, 
monitoring and evaluation mechanisms. The appraisal and evaluation are based on: (1) How the project results 
coincide with the priorities of the targeted population; (2) the degree to which the objectives of the project are 
achieved; (3) the cost-efficiency of the project; (4) the socioeconomic valuation of the project (by quantifying 
the positive and negative impacts); and (5) the sustainability of the project. For its entrepreneurship projects, a 
common set of fifteen indicators is used to monitor progress over time. These include the number of jobs being 
created, number of production activities, sales and value of assets.  
 
Today ALAC is considered to have one of the leading monitoring and evaluation systems for development 
projects in Peru.
87 
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2.5. Cooperation between stakeholders 
2.5.1. Ensuring an inclusive consultation process when signing the CDA 
The literature suggests that it is crucial to give various stakeholders a voice in the negotiation 
process of the CDAs.
88
 Within a Commune, which is defined by administrative boundaries, 
different parties might have diverging or contradictory interests. Small-scale miners, for 
example, might not necessarily have the same perspective on local development needs as 
representatives from the agricultural sector.  
 
A democratic election process of community leaders is one way to ensure that various 
stakeholders are represented in the negotiation process; another way is a multi-stakeholder 
forum, where diverse groups, for example, women, farmers and youth, are represented.
89
 In 
the case of the Communes of Siguiri, the democratically elected
90
 Conseil local of each 
Commune is arguably best placed to fill this role.
91
 However, it is uncertain whether these 




In this context, it might be useful to draw upon the experience of the MDG Center
93
 in giving 
all stakeholders a voice in the elaboration of the Local Development Plans (Box 16). 
 
Box 16: MDG Center experience: cooperation and engagement with stakeholders to 
elaborate LDPs 
The M G Center’s experience in identifying and cooperating with stakeholders in Siguiri to elaborate the 
LDPs of the Communes could serve as a model to drive the CDA process. The aim of the MDG Center was 
to engage in a process that would “enable the de elopment of a robust M G-based Local Development Plan 
that has the buy-in of the Government, is owned by communities and is supported by [SAG], amongst other 
stakeholders”
94
. The MDG Center proceeded in three steps - stakeholder engagement, co-planning, and 
validation - to achieve this outcome: 
The Stakeholder engagement process involved joint priority setting, pooling resources and planning 
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interventions with all stakeholders. These stakeholders included local communities, community-based 
organizations, government institutions, neighboring communities and focus groups, such as small-scale 
miners. The Stakeholder engagement was undertaken by both SAG and the MDG Center. 
In the Co-Planning phase, the MDG Center used the information received during the stakeholder 
engagement process to facilitate the elaboration of LDPs with the respective local government entities, local 
community members and SAG.  
For the Validation phase, the MDG Center engaged with all stakeholders again to ensure that everyone 
endorsed the outcomes of the co-planning phase. The draft-LDPs were reviewed by all stakeholders and 
comments/recommendations were taken into account. 
All of these steps involved very practical and logistical challenges, such as organizing the venues where the 
stakeholders could meet and providing food and travel reimbursements to participants living farther away 
from the meeting place, among others. Moreover, the MDG Center tried to ensure that all stakeholders were 
represented. For example, the MDG Center ensured that women were represented at these meetings.
95
 
2.5.2. Post-CDA involvement and cooperation 
While the literature suggests that the cooperation between the communities, companies and 
civil society is an important aspect of any local development regime, there is a lack of specific 
guidance for how this cooperation should work in practice.
96
 Such cooperation is desirable as 
it can improve the relationship and understanding among the parties and also increase the 
expertise available to the development regime.  The development processes of the current 
regime, as defined in the CCL, already provide for cooperation with third parties (Article 
520)
97
. The cooperation between the Communes and the MDG Center is an example of such 
cooperation. 
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Article 520, Code des collectivités locales: L’autorité exécuti e locale peut  a ec l’autorisation du Conseil  sous-
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While mining companies’ expertise and financial resources can contribute to the development 
regime, there is the risk that mining companies will disproportionally influence the decision 
making process. This becomes a problem when the mining companies’ 
development/investment agenda does not align with or account for the needs of the local 
communities. Therefore, the role of the company needs to be carefully determined, relying on 
the strengths of the company while also ensuring that the company cannot solely determine 
the projects that will be supported. Mining companies are often more capable in project 
management and monitoring and evaluation. Thus, even if a company is not given the right to 
determine the projects that will be financed, it can play a leading role in these areas. In 
particular, the company could assess what project management skills the CPD and communes 
lack and on this basis, identify a third party that could provide on-going support and training 
in project management to the CPD and communes. The third-party could be financed out of 
the development tax. Once sufficient expertise is developed at the CPD and communes, the 
support can be scaled back accordingly. Requiring CDA activities to be aligned to the LDPs 
provides additional safeguards to ensure the process serves the development needs of the 
community.  
 
Civil society also has a role to play, though it has not been provided for in the draft 
Ministerial Order. As lack of cooperation between all stakeholders has caused problems in the 
past, institutionalizing such cooperation is important. Regular meetings of a multi-stakeholder 
group with a clear agenda could help to ensure more successful cooperation. The 
organizational setup of the Palabora Foundation (see Box 17) provides a good example of the 
importance of regular interactions among all stakeholders in CDAs. 
 
The FODEL Decree and the Model CDA contain several provisions that require and enhance 
the cooperation between the stakeholders. It gives CPD a prominent role in the coordination 
of the development regime. Even though it is not clear how it will be composed, based on the 
experience of the current CPD, it can be assumed that the future CPD will also include 
different stakeholders, such as representatives from the Communes, the Préfecture, the mining 
companies and civil society. The stakeholders would therefore have a voice in the allocation 
of the development tax and could provide their input for the coordination of the development 
agenda in the Préfecture. These stakeholders would also be involved through the CPD in the 
monitoring of FODEL. As the Communes are going to be responsible for the management of 







than having the right to veto or influence the outcome of the monitoring and evaluation 
process, the Communes should only be present for consultative purposes.  
 
Regarding stakeholder cooperation in elaborating the development agenda and the execution 
of development projects, Article 3.1.4 of the Model CDA provides some guidance: the mining 
company has to support the Commune in the “conception  execution and monitoring of the 
projects” 
98
 Further, Article 3.2.7 of the Model CDA requires the Commune to hold a monthly 
meeting with the mining company. 
 
Beyond the cooperation already provided for in the FODEL Decree and the Model CDA, it 
would be useful to extend such cooperation requirements to the civil society. The CPD 
might serve as a forum for the cooperation at the Préfecture-level. A multi-stakeholder 
committee should serve as a forum to enable cooperation, as well as to support the 
implementation of the development agenda at the local level. 
 
Box 17: Involvement of mining companies in local development – The Palabora 
Foundation 
The Palabora Foundation (Foundation) was setup in 1986 by the Palabora Mining Company (Palabora), a large-
scale copper mine in northeast South Africa in which Rio Tinto owns a 57.7 percent interest, to assist 
communities within a 50km radius of the mine. The Foundation was financed by a launching grant from 
Palabora and the commitment of annual contributions worth 3 percent of net profits. To guarantee the long-
term financial sustainability of the Foundation, an Administrative Reserve Fund was set up; since 2001, the 
operational cost of the Foundation has been covered by the interest earned on this fund. The community 
development programs have evolved over the years and currently focus on three main streams, namely 
education, health and economic development. The latter includes business development training courses and 
skill development programs in masonry, carpentry, food preparation and garment production. In 2008, the 





The success of the Foundation can partly be traced back to organizational setup and the involvement of 
different stakeholders. The Foundation is governed by a Board of Trustees, which meets on a quarterly basis to 
review the progress of the programs. The Board is composed of three high-ranking Palabora representatives; 
the director of the Foundation, who manages the day-to-day activities; and four representatives from the 
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community, three with backgrounds in relevant work streams (education, health and business development) and 
one traditional leader to ensure the transfer of information to the traditional authorities. An audit committee 
composed of Pricewaterhouse Coopers as external and SAB&T as internal auditors ensure good corporate 




Once a year, the Foundation meets with all relevant stakeholders to discuss its activities and update its strategy. 
The stakeholders include representatives from the local and provincial government, local communities, the 
Chamber of Business, the Trade and Tourism Council and traditional councils. During these meetings, future 
projects are proposed and, if agreed upon, these projects are aligned with municipal and provincial 
development plans.
101 
2.5.3. Third-party funding and cross–Commune border cooperation 
In discussions with the Government, SAG has indicated that it would appreciate if the LDF 
included a mechanism that allows for third party funding for large infrastructure cross-
Commune projects such as main roads. Since these infrastructure projects involve more than 
one Commune, a mechanism should be created that allows for cooperation of the mining 
companies at the inter-Commune-level, such as the Conférences Inter-Collectivités or 
Regroupements described above. With mechanisms for third-party funding and cross-
Commune cooperation, SAG has indicated that it would be willing to contribute additional 
funding to projects that align with SAG’s business interests  By providing for third-party 
funding, successful projects can be expanded through, for example, donor support, thereby 
increasing the developmental impact (see an example in Box 12). Alternative funding sources 
could make up for local development tax contributions when mining revenues are low as 
demonstrated in the case of the Namibian Rössing Foundation (see Box 13). 
2.5.4.  Cooperation with newly qualified “local communities”  
Irrespective of the final definition of “local communities” pursuant to Article 13  of the 
Mining Code, it will be important to ensure that new communities that  ualify as “local 
communities”, for example, those that become impacted at a later stage in the operations, to 
join the local development regime. These newly impacted Communes should be in a position 
to sign CDAs with the mining company as well. Map 2 shows different mining blocks where 
SAG might start operations in the future and that are located in areas likely to impact “new” 
local communities under Article 130. Since the regime will be aligned with the CCL, the 
cooperation mechanisms of Regroupement and Conférences Inter-Collectivités, for example, 
would allow new Communes to be integrated into the CPD and any framework agreements. 











The annual review of the definition of communities under the Ahafo Social Responsibility 
Agreement, described in Box 9 above, provides an example of a review mechanism that could 
be contemplated. 
 
Figure 3: Communes affected by potential Siguiri expansion 
 
2.6. Capacity building 
 
Capacity building should be undertaken long before subnational revenue sharing is 
established and consequently also before the relevant CDAs are signed.
102
 In order to prepare 
for the negotiation of the CDAs and the elaboration and implementation of the development 
objectives, capacity-building processes should be started as soon as possible.  Going forward, 
the decrees or regulations governing the CDA negotiation process could include capacity 
building as a first step. 
 
Capacity building should be based on:  
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1) providing the Communes with the necessary expertise to successfully negotiate the 
CDA; 
2) providing training on transparency, accountability, project appraisal, monitoring 
and evaluation principles to ensure that the LDF is managed according to the 
principles of the mining code; and  
3) developing mid- and long-term capacity-building programs.  
 
The FODEL Decree and the Ministerial Order only reiterate the broad requirement to provide 
for capacity building. The Model CDA provides some additional detail: the Commune must 
use the SPD to support and build the capacities of the local elected authorities, the members 
of the management committees and technical staff (presumably those at the Commune-level 
that implement the development projects, though this is not specified) and provide them with 
the tools to manage the resources of the Commune effectively
103
. The Model CDA specifies 
that the capacity-building measures should focus on CCL and the mission of the Communes, 
the different organs of the Conseil local, the management of the responsibilities transferred to 
the Communes, budget management and planning, development of companies and the 




2.6.1. Capacity building for CDA negotiations 
The Model CDA deals with capacity building in respect of management and implementation 
of development projects.  As the Communes may not necessarily have the expertise to 
negotiate the CDA on their own behalf, it is also important to support the Communes in this 
process. Even if mines are legally bound to provide 1% of turnover to FODEL and even if 
regulations get to a detailed level that limit the scope for negotiations, there is still a need for 
communities to be equipped with the right negotiation skills to ensure that the funded projects 
align with communities’ de elopment priorities and that the rights and obligations of both the 
mining companies and the Communes contribute to achieving these priorities.  Each 
community will have different development needs and the regulations need to leave scope for 
the expression of each community’s specificity in C As  
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Mining companies are likely to have better knowledge of the technical and economic aspects 
of the mining operations, which are important to understand in order to develop CDAs.
105
 It is 
difficult for the parties to agree on a sustainable management plan for the fund’s resources if 
the operation plans and prospects of the mining companies are not known or understood. 
Preparing documentation to inform the stakeholders about production forecasts and potential 
eventualities could help alleviate this asymmetry. For example, knowing about the probability 
of revenue volatility would encourage stakeholders to include expenditure-smoothing 
measures.  
 
Assisting communities with procuring independent expert advice is critical. The question as 
to who bears the costs for such advice is an issue that should be addressed in the relevant 
Ministerial Order. The current draft does not contain such a provision. Experience in different 
countries shows that the companies commonly cover the costs.
106
 Even if external experts are 
hired to assist in defining the CDA requirements, it is important that the Communes are truly 
taking part in the discussions. This has to be seen as an important cornerstone in the 
cooperation between the mining companies and the Communes. The state could appoint an 




Box 18: Capacity building before entering into CDA - Ahafo consultations108 
The Ahafo CDAs, between Newmont Ghana and local traditional leaders, took approximately 3 years to 
develop.  Before the negotiations even started, there was a period of stakeholder engagement and capacity 
building, which was aimed at improving the technical skills of the communities in negotiating techniques and 
land ownership legislation, as well as communicating the aims of the CDAs and information about Newmont. 
Engagement was also targeted at identifying the individuals who would be responsible for representing the 
communities in the negotiations.  This eventually involved 54 representatives from regional government, 
community groups and NGOs. The stakeholder engagement process included meetings with individual 
communities, as well as groups that represented specific stakeholders, such as women and youth.  Feedback 
from stakeholders indicated that this process of capacity building and engagement was key to the issue of prior 
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In addition to the capacity building, during the negotiations themselves, a lawyer represented the communities 
and a neutral professor who was an expert in the area moderated the negotiations.  Feedback from both NGOs 
and Newmont representatives found this moderator important in the process, as they were able to offer 
suggestions of sustainable solutions to the various stakeholder groups when concerns were raised as to the 
potential impracticality or unsustainability of certain proposals.
110
 
2.6.2. Long-term capacity-building programs 
A dual approach that allows development of expertise while providing continuing support 
seems to be an appropriate way to achieve the capacity-building goals.
111
 The experience of 
CECI is an example of such a dual approach: CECI not only helped to build capacities, but 
also supported the relevant institutions in the execution of the development projects. The 
support of the Communes allows, at least in theory, the execution of projects in a transparent 
and efficient manner even before the necessary capacities are built for the local institutions to 
implement the projects themselves. The goal is to support the local institutions while 
providing training, and then to transfer the responsibilities once the necessary expertise is 
available. The CECI experience with the CPD in Siguiri suggests, however, that such transfer 
and integration of responsibilities into the existing regime is not self-evident. 
 
A concrete example of a capacity-building project in the local development context is the 
cooperation between  rogramme d’Appui aux Communautés Villageoises   ACV)  Agence 
Francaise de Developpement (AFD), RioTinto and CECI in the Commune of Boké (see Box 
19).  This case also provides a useful example of a framework in which an external experts is 
hired for monitoring and evaluation purposes under the supervision of a multi-stakeholder 
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Box 19: Capacity-building projects – the PACV Rio Tinto Project in the Commune of 
Boké 
The project aims to: 
(1) Build capacities for the elaboration of a development agenda with concrete development projects. This 
includes elaborating a Socio-Economic Needs Assessment, a Local Development Plan and an Annual 
Investment Plan; 
(2) The project aims to build capacities for the management and execution of the development agenda. This 
includes the creation of committees for the following aspects: 
1) Committee for Management of the financial resources (CMFR); 
2) Committee for Management of the tender offers (CMTO);  
3) Committee for Monitoring of the execution of the development projects (CME); 
4) Committee for Monitoring of the transparency of the management of financial resources (CMT); and  
5) Committee for Management of disputes relating to tender offers and execution of the projects (CMD). 
 
With the help of CMTO, every Commune hired an engineer to monitor the construction works of the 
development projects. At the end of each AIP, the engineer is evaluated by the CME. The members of the CME 
received trainings in order to develop the capacities to undertake this evaluation.  
 
Pursuant to the PACV Guidelines on Tender offers, the CMTO is composed of a member of the Conseil local 
of the Commune; one elected authority of the District where the development project will be implemented; 
three members of civil society, among whom at least one has to be a one woman; three more representatives of 
the Commune
112
 and the engineer. These members received training in order to development the necessary 
capacities to prepare and evaluate a tender offer. 
 





Civil society can play an important role in providing support and capacity building for local 
stakeholders. With the assistance of an NGO, the commune could put in place a strong 
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monitoring and evaluation process whereby local experts are hired and are overseen by a 
multi-stakeholder committee. 
2.7. Elements of the CDA process  
In Guinea, no guidance currently exists regarding the process for entering into CDAs.  The 
Ministerial Order addresses implementation in more detail, yet it could still be amended to 
provide further guidance. The Ministerial Order should prescribe the process that must be 
followed in order to ensure that: (1) there is stakeholder engagement and capacity building 
prior CDA negotiations, (2) that representatives of the local communities are negotiating 
and executing CDAs, (3) that CDAs align with the LDPs, (4) that sustainability is taken 
into account in the project selection process, (5) that there is multi-stakeholder 
representation in determining projects to be funded under the CDAs, and (6) that there are 
appropriate monitoring mechanisms in place.  However, the CDAs should be articulated by 
the affected Commune so that its provisions are appropriate to the circumstances of the 
particular community.  The Ministerial Order should not be too prescriptive in what must be 
included in a CDA, but should provide overall guidance to achieve the main principles 
outlined in Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4: The main principles of CDAs 
 
 








A key issue to consider is the timing for entering into the CDA – whether this is done before 
or after the mining license is granted.  From the Ministerial Order, it appears that the process 
of negotiating CDAs will occur immediately after the notification of the grant of rights. In 
contrast, the Development Forum in Papua New Guinea is an example of a process whereby 
stakeholders are given an opportunity to discuss the project prior to the granting of the mining 
license so that the views of affected parties can be taken into account in the decision to grant 
or not grant the license (see Box 20). 
 
Box 20: Development Forum in Papua New Guinea 
The mining legislation in PNG requires that before any mining licence is granted, the Minister must 
con ene a “ e elopment Forum”  in order to consider the  iews of those who will be affected by the 
project.  The Minister is required to invite individuals to represent the project developer, the landowners, 
the national government, and the provincial government.  While the representatives do not have a right to 




, these Development Forums have created the space for resource development 
discussions and decision-making, and have ensured transparency in identifying benefits and accountability 
for mining projects.  This has led to increased community support for the mining projects.   
 
The outcome of the Development Forum is usually a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) between 
landowners, provincial and national governments and the companies.  These define roles and 
responsibilities of all of the parties, the breakdown of royalty distribution to communities and provincial 
governments, funding commitments by government and the companies, economic and social development 
plans (to be aligned with local development plans), environmental management and, more recently, the 
establishment of trust funds to manage the funding to the communities.  Under the mining legislation, 




Other issues to be considered include the circumstances in which the parties will be allowed 
to leave the CDA negotiation process. The limited causes for such withdrawal might be the 
company’s decision not to pursue its operations or the Go ernment rescinding its support for 
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 A related issue is when the parties fail to reach an agreement. The Community 
Development Agreement Model Regulations and Example Guidelines suggest that the parties 




Grievance and feedback mechanisms should also be provided in the CDA to facilitate their 
implementation.  While the Model CDA in Ministerial Order provides for ultimate dispute 
resolution when grie ances cannot be settled “amicably”  it does not set out any particular 
mechanism for dealing with grievances before this point.  Including such a mechanism could 
strengthen the Ministerial Order.  This mechanism should be independent from the mining 
company. The grievance resolution body could be composed of multiple stakeholders, 
including local and traditional authorities, and should be integrated with existing mechanisms 
in both the Communes and the mining project.  Therefore, some preliminary scoping of 
existing mechanisms is required before one is determined for the particular CDA.  The 
mechanism should also be accessible to all stakeholders, in terms of language, literacy, 
geography and technology.
118
 In order to ensure efficiency, the mechanism could provide for 
assessment of the severity of grievances so that they can be dealt with accordingly. Box 21 
provides some of the legal text of the Social Responsibility Agreement between Newmont 
and the Ahafo Community in Ghana related to the “Complaints Resolution Committee”. 
 
Box 21: Complaints Resolution Committee at Newmont’s Ahafo mine 
The Social Responsibility Agreement establishes a Complaints Resolution Committee that is “responsible for 
resol ing any complaints relating to the implementation of this Agreement”  Article 14 1)).  This is to be done 
using “dialogue and negotiation”  Schedule 3 1))  
 
The Complaints Resolution Committee is chaired by the Co-Moderator of the Agreement Forum
119
 and 
composed of four additional members of the Agreement Forum, two from the Company and two from the 
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 The Agreement Forum is composed of Representatives of the Community and the Company and it has the 
“oversight responsibility for implementing the Agreement” (Article 8). The members of the Forum appoint an 
external Moderator and Co-Moderator (Article 5). 
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 The Agreement Forum is seconded by a Standing Committee of Forum, a smaller committee that is composed 







The Complaints Resolution Committee “consider[s] and sol e[s] any complaint”  Article 15 a))  reports all 
complaints and their outcome to Standing Committee of Forum (Article 15(b)) and makes recommendations for 
the review of complaints resolution policies (Article 15(c)). The complaints are lodged with the chairman 
(Schedule 3(2 a-c)). 
 
The chairman appoints the members of the Committee within 10 days (Schedule 3(3)) and convenes a meeting 
within 30 days upon receipt of complaint (Schedule 3(4)). 
 
Decisions are made by consensus or majority of the votes; the chairman decides in case of equal votes (Article 
17(3)). 
 
If the Complaints Resolution Committee is unable to resolve the complaint, it will be referred to a Standing 
Committee of Forum (Schedule 3(7)). If Standing Committee of Forum is unable to resolve the complaint, it will 








3. Conclusions and recommendations: 
3.1. Issues to be considered for inclusion in the draft FODEL Decree and 
Ministerial Order 
 
Definition of “local communities” 
 The regulations should clearly define the communities that benefit from the LDF and 
enter into CDAs (i.e., pro ide a clear definition of “local communities” used in Article 
130 of the Mining Code).  Although the Annex to the Ministerial Order suggests that 
each Commune will enter into a CDA with the mining company, neither the Order nor 
the FODEL Decree specifically defines “local community”   A definition of 
“proximity” should also be included for the purpose of allocation of the L F and the 
CDAs. 
 Triggers should be defined in order to ensure that new communities that may be 
affected by an expanding mining project can be included in the development regime. 
 To balance the decentralization goals of the Government with the need to spend 
mining revenues at the community level efficiently, it is suggested that mining 
companies sign individual CDAs with affected Communes (as required by the 
Ministerial Order), as well as an umbrella framework agreement with the new CPD. 
While the project decision-making process is kept with the Communes, the CPD (or 
another umbrella institution) could serve as a platform to discuss and coordinate the 
development agendas of the Communes in the Préfecture. 
 
Allocation of mining revenues 
 In order to allocate funding efficiently and foster sustainable development around the 
mine more broadly, it is recommended that spending should not be restricted to areas 
within the Commune that are close to the mine.  The Decree should include a 
provision to make this allocation issue clear and indicate C  ’s role in determining 
the allocation of the funds amongst and within the Communes. 
 While Article 130 (development tax/LDF) could serve to alleviate tensions between 
the mining companies and the local communities and help to build harmonious 
relationships, Article 165 could provide for the sharing of mining revenues more 
broadly, with communities that do not benefit from the LDF. This redistribution 










Revenue management of the LDF 
 The Decree should contemplate mechanisms to smooth local expenditure. This can be 
done either through a local stabilization fund or the adjustment of national transfers to 
the Commune level depending on mining revenues. 
 Third party funding should be allowed for projects that are aligned to development 
priorities and proposed by communities  
 
Determining and managing projects under the LDF 
 The FODEL Decree should make clear what is meant by “projects creating re enue 
generating acti ities” as this sentence might se erely limit the project selection e en if 
aligned with the LDPs.  
 A multi-stakeholder committee at the Commune-level should be established to 
determine projects to be funded under the LDF, in line with the CDAs and the LDPs.  
This could include community representatives (including those from diverse groups 
within the communities), local government representatives, national government 
representati es  ci il society and company representati es   The mining company’s 
role could be particularly focused on supporting the management of projects that are 
selected. In particular, the mining company could provide a gap assessment that 
identifies areas where the local authorities need training to make efficient use of the 
FODEL funds and help identify external assistance to provide on-the-job capacity 
building. This assistance should be temporary and aimed at skill transfer. The capacity 
building costs could be paid out of the development tax. In the current draft, the 
FODEL Decree does not address this issue and the Model CDA provides only for the 
participation of the mining companies in supporting the Commune in the conception, 
execution and monitoring of the projects.  
 Regular meetings of this multi-stakeholder committee, similar to the monthly meeting 
by the company and the Commune provided for in the model CDA, should be required 
in order to review and update plans. 
 In addition to these regular meetings, there needs to be effective coordination among 
the Communes.  Beyond the monitoring function, the FODEL Decree and the 
regulation that will set up the CPD should emphasize C  ’s coordination role. While 
the CPD would not necessarily be vested with formal decision-making powers, it 







preparing the LDPs and AIPs of the Communes, publishing reviews of the 
development approaches of the different Communes, monitoring the impact of the 
projects, identifying best practices, identifying qualified third parties that the 
Communes could cooperate with and/or elaborating guidelines for tender offers. 
 A participatory negotiation and implementation process is important in order to take 
into account the views of all stakeholders.  Such a process sets the basis for a more 
productive cooperation with external stakeholders like companies and development 
partners.  This could increase support for the mining project and therefore decrease the 
likelihood of conflict.  
 The LDPs of Communes that benefit from the LDF should be adapted to fulfill the 
objectives of the Article 130 of the Mining Code and include mechanisms that 
guarantee the long-term sustainability post-mine closure. Even though LDPs are only 
5 years long, the concern for post-closure sustainability should be clearly embedded in 
the CDA and carried from one LDP to the next. The requirement to take the long-
term, post-mine closure perspective into account is stated in both in the FODEL 
Decree and the Model CDA.  
 
CDA process 
 The Ministerial Order, in providing a model CDA, provides detailed guidance on the 
terms of the CDAs.  More flexibility is needed to ensure that the particular projects 
and development objectives can be specific to the circumstances of each Commune 
that enters into a CDA.   
 It is recommended that the Ministerial Order be expanded to provide a framework for 
the process of negotiating the CDA and for its implementation.   
 The timing for the negotiation of the CDA is specified to commence after the 
notification of the award of mineral rights, yet it would be preferable to incorporate 
the CDA process before the grant of the mining license. This would allow the 
government and the company to hear the community’s  iews, and could increase the 
community’s support for the project.  Of course, for the mining licenses already in 
existence, this timing is not possible.  All other regulations relating to the processes 
for negotiation of CDAs (outlined below) should, however, be followed for these 
mining licenses.   
 Apart from including the communities, it would be beneficial for representatives of 







discussions leading to the CDAs, in order to ensure that regional and national planning 
priorities are aligned with the priorities identified in the CDA.  The CDA can also 
assign roles and responsibilities to the local and national government.  The Model 
Convention does assign a role to the Collectivité locale (Article 3.2), which is 
important to ensure that it is also involved in providing programs for community 
development, which in turn enables sustainability. The responsibilities of the mining 
company and the Collectivité locale should be adaptable, so that the prescribed 
functions can be tailored to the particular circumstances and requirements of each 
Commune that enters into a CDA. 
 The Ministerial Order should be expanded to require stakeholder engagement.  This is 
useful to raise awareness of the project and the need for the CDA.   
 It is important that the engagement process includes all groups in the communities.  In 
addition to ensuring that the views of all these groups are taken into account, this can 
also assist in identifying the individuals who will be responsible for negotiating the 
CDA as representatives of the community, so that all members of the community will 
support the CDA and benefit from it.  The Ministerial Order provides that the 
President of the relevant Collectivité locale will sign the CDA.  It is important that the 
necessary engagement and consultation with the community occurs before the 
President signs the CDA, in order for the agreement to represent the interests of the 
community.  
 The Ministerial Order should require capacity building prior negotiations.  This 
capacity building should aim to improve the skills of the communities in negotiating 
CDAs as well as in articulating development priorities.   
 The above processes all take a significant amount of time.  The Ministerial Order 
currently requires CDAs to be signed within six months for existing conventions and 
three months for those that do not have existing conventions.  This time period may 
not be sufficient. The Ministerial Order should not constrain the period of time 
required to ensure effective capacity building and engagement. 
 An independent mediator should part in the negotiations. 
3.2. Institutional arrangements to complement regulations 
 
While both the Mining Code and the CCL contemplate increased transparency, accountability 







goal is met.  Capacity building will be needed to ensure that the institutions and relevant 
stakeholders are able to undertake their roles.   
 
 A monitoring mechanism should be established to monitor the outcomes of the LDF 
projects and the CDA processes and projects.  The party responsible for monitoring 
should have a degree of independence from the parties involved in determining and 
implementing the projects.  
 Apart from project-specific monitoring tools, broader development indices such as the 
Millennium Development Goals should be included to measure the effectiveness of 
the projects under the CDA. 
 The regulations should specify a monitoring process for the implementation of the 
projects. The current draft regulations provide for two levels of monitoring. The first 
level (CPD in cooperation with companies) monitors how the Communes manage the 
development tax, but only with respect to accounting standards and the project 
selection; the implementation of the projects is not monitored at this level. The second 
level (National Committee) monitors the overall development regime.  
 MATD and MoM should specify the National Committee’s role in the Ministerial 
Order.
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 It is currently not clear whether the National Committee is intended to 
monitor specific development projects, or whether it plays a role similar to CPD but at 
the national level. One role that could be played by the National Committee is to 
ensure that development projects selected under FODEL and established under CDAs 
align with national planning priorities. 
 While the current drafts provide for cooperation in the monitoring process, this 
cooperation only includes the mining companies and SPD. The cooperation should be 
extended to other stakeholders, such as representatives from civil society.  Civil 
society could be represented within the CPD, as is the case in the current CPD.  Civil 
society can play an important role in monitoring the LDF and CDA processes, as well 
as providing support and capacity building for local authorities.   
 Once cooperation mechanisms are established, a multi-stakeholder committee could 
be set up to oversee the work of local experts hired for specific tasks of the monitoring 
and evaluation process. 
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 In order to foster the cooperation of the companies and the Communes with civil 
society, the CDA should also provide for their presence at the monthly meeting under 
Article 3.2.7, Model CDA. 
 Documents related to the selection, evaluation and monitoring of projects should be 
made publicly available in a form that can be understood by the local communities. 
This should be also the case for the CDAs, LDPs and any other documentation related 
to the development funding.  The FODEL Decree currently contemplates publication 
of the contributions by the mining companies to the LDF, and the Ministerial Order 
requires that CDAs to be made accessible to the public. This should be expanded to 
any documentation related to LDF funded projects. A publicly accessible website 
could be created to act as a repository of this information. The information should also 
be available for public access within the affected Communes. This could be done at 
the office of the Maire/Président or the Sous-Préfet.  
 The Model Convention requires the company to develop a communications plan to 
provide information regularly to the community.
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  This communication plan should 
be subject to approval by the CPD to ensure that the plan and all communications 
under it are appropriate for the skill level of the communities. Compliance of the 
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